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Abstract
We study random assignment economies with expected-
utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a sin-
gle object. Inspired on Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979)
Pseudomarket mechanism (PM) and on a serial dicta-
torship, we introduce the Sequential Pseudomarket (SP)
where groups of agents are called turn by turn and par-
ticipate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. To
measure e¢ ciency, we focus on the set of ex-ante Pareto-
optimal (PO) random assignments and on the ex-ante
weak core (CO). We nd: 1) PM  PO but the converse
is not always true (there is no Second Theorem of Welfare
Economics), 2) PO  SP but the converse is not always
true, 3) SP  CO
Keywords: Random assignment, ex-ante e¢ ciency, weak
core, sequential pseudomarket
JEL codes: D47, D50, D60
1 Introduction
We study random assignment economies. In a random assignment,
each agent is provided with a probability distribution over the set of
object types. Agents have preferences over their assigned distribu-
tions according to the expected utility form. No monetary transfers
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are allowed. Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) seminal paper sug-
gests that a pseudomarket can be constructed in which each agent
is endowed by some articial income with which she can buy assign-
ment probabilities. Each object type is given a nonnegative price
and each agent buys a proper probability distribution (probabilities
add up to 1) over them. Given the endowment vector, there is at
least one equilibrium price vector yielding a feasible random assign-
ment as an outcome. Moreover, this random assignment is ex-ante
Pareto-e¢ cient, in a sort of First Theorem of Welfare Economics for
random assignment economies.
In this note, we prove that there is no Second Theorem of Welfare
Economics for random assignment economies. That is, if a random
assignment is ex-ante Pareto-optimal, there might not be a vector
of articial incomes and a vector of non-zero prices such that a
pseudomarket equilibrium exists yielding that random assignment
as its outcome.
Proving that a quasiequilibrium exists (where an agents pre-
ferred probability distribution cannot be cheaper) that yields the
ex-ante Pareto-optimal assignment follows an almost standard tech-
nique. But a quasiequilibrium is not always an equilibrium. We
construct an example in which the only quasiequilibrium (up to
a¢ ne transformations) is not an equilibrium. For one agent, the
assigned object is the cheapest one. She prefers another object that
should be more expensive in equilibrium. Yet the preferences of the
remaining agents force the latter two prices to be equal.
We next present the Sequential Pseudomarket (SP) mechanism.
Groups of agents are called in turns that attend the pseudomar-
ket for the remaining objects. A SP-equilibrium is a sequence of
pseudomarket equilibria turn by turn. It is easy to see that SP is
a combination of serial dictatorship and pseudomarkets. We show
that every ex-ante Pareto-optimal random assignment can be the
outcome of a SP-equilibrium. However, not every SP-equilibrium
yields an ex-ante Pareto-optimal random assignment. First comers
to the pseudomarket may be indi¤erent about remaining objects
after they leave while followers might not be indi¤erent at all.
Next, we dene the ex-ante weak core as the set that contains
all feasible random assignments such that, for each one, there is no
coalition of agents and redistribution of probabilities across them in
which all agents in the coalition are ex-ante strictly better-o¤. We
nally show that the ex-ante weak core contains the set of random
assignments generated by SP-equilibria.
The closest reference to this note is Mas-Colells (1992) equilib-
rium theory approach to the assignment of indivisible goods. He
provides a general result for every kind of assignment economy with
possibly satiated preferences. For any ex-ante Pareto-optimal allo-
cation, he shows the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with slack
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supporting it.
More than thirty years after the seminal paper by Hylland and
Zeckhauser, pseudomarkets are attracting increasing interest both
in nite and continuum economies.1 Examples of recent papers are
Budish and Azevedo (2012) on strategy-proofness in the large that
applies to pseudomarkets, Budish, Che, Kojima and Milgrom (2012)
on pseudomarket mechanisms for multidimensional assignment, and
He, Miralles and Yan (2012) on reconciling discriminatory priorities
with pseudomarket mechanisms. The present note contributes to
this recent literature in that it claries the relation among the sets
of pseudomarket equilibrium outcomes, ex-ante Pareto-optimal ran-
dom assignments, sequential pseudomarket equilibrium outcomes
and the weak core. Each one is a subset of the next, while the
opposite may not be true.
2 The model
In this economy there is a nite set of agents N = f1; :::; ng. The
notation x; y::: is used for a generic element of N . There is a set
of object types S = f1; :::; sg. The notation i; j::: serves to indicate a
generic element of S. For each object type j there is a number of
identical copies j 2 N.  = (1; :::; s) is the supply in this economy.
We have enough supply in the sense that
P
j2S 
j  n.2
A random assignment is a n s matrix Q whose generic element
qjx  0 is the probability that agent x obtains a copy of object type
j. This matrix is stochastic:
P
j2S q
j
x = 1 for any x 2 N . Agent xs
random assignment is the probability distribution qx = (q1x; :::; qsx) 2 s
(s is the s   1 dimensional simplex). A random assignment is a
pure assignment if each of its elements is either 1 or 0. A random
assignment is feasible if Q0 1n   (where 1n is a vector of n ones and
0 denotes the transpose of a matrix). A feasible random assignment
can be expressed as a lottery over feasible pure assignments.
Let V 2 Rns+ denote a n s matrix of nonnegative von Neumann-
Morgenstein valuations, whose generic element vjx indicates agent xs
valuation for object type j. A generic agent xs valuation vector is
vx = (v
1
x; :::; v
s
x). She values her random assignment qx as the vectorial
product ux(qx) = vx  qx. Each agent x has a set of most-preferred
object types Mx = argmax
j2S
vjx. An economy is a triple E = (N; ; V ).
Let FE denote the set of feasible random assignments in an econ-
omy E. A feasible random assignment QPO is ex-ante Pareto-optimal
1See Thomson and Zhou (1993) for a result on e¢ cient and fair
allocations in continuum economies.
2Notice that the weak inequality allows for an easy inclusion of an
outside option for every agent.
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at an economy E if for any random assignment Q, diag(V Q0) >
diag(V Q0PO) =) Q =2 FE. (diag denotes the diagonal of a matrix, and
> indicates that the inequality is strict for at least one element).
Considering a feasible random assignment QCO, let a blocking
coalition C  N be dened as follows: 9Q such that a) qCOx  vx < qx  vx
for all x 2 C and b) Px2C qx    Px2NnC qCOx . A feasible random
assignment QCO belongs to the weak core of an economy E if its
unique blocking coalition is C = ?.
A price vector is notated as P 2 Rs+. A price vector P  constitutes
a pseudomarket quasiequilibrium for an economy E with associated
feasible random assignment Q if for any random assignment Q and
any agent x we have ux(qx) > ux(qx) =) P   qx  P   qx. A price
vector P  constitutes a pseudomarket equilibrium for an economy
E with associated feasible random assignment Q if for any random
assignment Q and any agent x we have ux(qx) > ux(qx) =) P   qx >
P   qx.
3 No Second Welfare Theorem
Theorem 1 For a nite economy E, let Q be an ex-ante Pareto-
optimal random assignment. There may not exist a price vector P 
that constitutes a pseudomarket equilibrium for this economy E with
associated random assignment Q.
Proof. Consider an example with N = fx1; x2; y1; y2; zg, object types
S = f1; :::; 4g, supply vector  = (1; 1; 1; 2), and preferences as fol-
lows: vx = (3; 2; 1; 0); vy = (3; 2; 0; 1); vz = (0; 0; 2; 1) (agents x1 and x2
have identical preferences vx; likewise for y-type agents). Consider
the feasible random assignment Q such that: qx = (1=4; 1=4; 1=2; 0);
qy = (1=4; 1=4; 0; 1=2); qz = (0; 0; 0; 1) (agents x1 and x2 have identical
assignment qx; likewise for y-type agents).
Q is ex-ante Pareto-optimal. z would be willing to give  2 (0; 1)
units of object type 4 in exchange of no less than =2 units of object
type 3 (and 1  =2 units of the other object types). Yet no x type
nor y type agent (nor any coalition of them) would accept any such
trade. There is no mutually benecial trade among x type and
y type agents either. For them object types 3 and 4 could be re-
garded as a unique object type 3from which each agent picks half
a unit. All these agents have identical preferences (and identical
random assignments) over object types 1, 2 and 3.
We show that there is no pseudomarket equilibrium supporting
Q. Since qx is interior for three object types, the equilibrium prices
for these objects must be an a¢ ne transformation of the x agents
preferences over these objects (otherwise some strictly preferred dis-
tribution would be cheaper). Then: P 1 = ax + 3bx; P 2 = ax + 2bx;
P 3 = ax + bx; with ax 2 R; bx > 0. Analogously for y type agents:
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P 1 = ay + 3by; P
2 = ay + 2by; P
4 = ay + by; with ay 2 R; by > 0. From the
prices for object types 1 and 2 we deduce that bx = by and ax = ay.
Hence P 3 = P 4. But this cannot be an equilibrium price vector since
z strictly prefers object type 3 to her assignment and it is not more
expensive.
We can see that the price vector in this counterexample consti-
tutes a quasiequilibrium with Q as associated random assignment,
for agent z does not have a more-preferred distribution that is at
the same time cheaper than the assigned distribution. Indeed, it
can be shown that any ex-ante Pareto-optimal random assignment
can be supported by a quasiequilibrium price vector. The existence
of a quasiequilibrium does not provide much information, though.
For instance, a vector with equal prices across object types is always
a quasiequilibrium. For this reason, we need to provide a di¤erent
characterization of ex-ante Pareto-optima.
We go back to the counterexample. We can observe that the qua-
siequilibrium price vector was xed by x type and y type agents
preferences. In a reduced economy without z, this vector would in-
deed constitute a pseudomarket equilibrium. It is as if z was "wait-
ing for her turn" and picking the remaining object, a copy of object
type 4, after the other agents had received their pseudomarket equi-
librium random assignments.
4 Sequential pseudomarkets
Let the set N be partitioned into disjoint ordered sets N1; :::; N with
  n. Start with a reduced economy with N1 on the demand side
and 1 =  as the supply side. Calculate a pseudomarket equilibrium
allocation Q1 for this reduced economy. For t = 2; ::; s, calculate the
remaining supply t = t 1  Q0t 1  1jNt 1j and use Nt on the demand
side to calculate a new pseudomarket equilibrium allocation Qt for
the agents in Nt. The vertical composite matrix Q = [Q1; :::; Q]
constitutes a Sequential Pseudomarket (SP) equilibrium random as-
signment given the ordered partition N1; :::; N.3
When  = n we have a Serial Dictatorship, whereas on the other
extreme we have a Pseudomarket equilibrium outcome if  = 1. SP
is indeed a combination of these two mechanisms.
The following result states that any ex ante Pareto-optimal as-
signment can be supported by a SP-equilibrium.
Theorem 2 For a nite economy E, let Q be an ex-ante Pareto-
optimal random assignment. Then there is an ordered partition
3Agents could be WLOG labeled in a way that the matrices Q
and V are consistent (i.e. each row refers to the same agent in both
matrices).
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N1; :::; N of the set N such that Q is a Sequential Pseudomarket
equilibrium random assignment given the ordered partition N1; :::; N.
Proof. It follows a recursive argument. We explain the rst iteration,
which is afterwards repeated with the "continuation economy" (we
dene it below) until all agents are removed. We start this iteration
by considering a reduced economy Er = (Nr; r; V r) that is resulting
from removing all agents x who obtain a most-preferred object type:
NM = fx 2 N : Pj2Mx qjx = 1g. We also remove their assignments
from the supply vector, obtaining r. The remaining assignment is
denoted as Qr = (qx)x2Nr . This is without loss of generality since
any price vector would meet the competitive equilibrium condition
for these agents. We also skip the simple case in which everyone
obtains a most-preferred assignment.
For any agent x 2 Nr there exists a non-empty convex set of
strictly preferred probability distributions Ux = fq 2 s : ux(q) >
ux(q

x)g. Likewise, the set U =
P
x2Nr Ux is well-dened and convex.
Naturally, U  jNrj  s (since Px2Nr qx = jNrj). Let us dene Y =Y
j2S [0; 
r
j ] which is also convex. Since Q is ex-ante Pareto-optimal
(and so is Qr for Er) we have U \ Y = ?. Applying the separating
hyperplane theorem to the amplied simplex jNrj s, there exists a
price vector P 2 Rs+=f(p; :::; p) : p  0g and a number w 2 R such that
P a  w  P b, for any a 2 U; b 2 Y . We get rid of price vectors with all
equal elements since those would not divide the amplied simplex.
The object types with excess supply (
P
x2Nr q
rj
x < 
rj) would have a
zero price component in any such vector P (P j = 0).
Let M be a ns random assignment matrix (with generic element
mjx) such that
P
j2Mx m
j
x = 1 for every x 2 N . Consider a random
assignment Q such that diag(V Q0)  diag(V Q0). Consider a number
 2 (0; 1) and build the random assignment Q = Q+(1 )M . Since
qx 2 Ux for every x 2 Nr, we have P 
P
x2Nr q

x  w. Taking the limit,
since lim
!1
Q = Q, we have P Px2Nr qx  w.
The same applies to the case Q = Q : P Px2Nr qx  w. But we
know that
P
x2Nr q

x 2 Y because Q is feasible, implying P 
P
x2Nr q

x 
w. We conclude P Px2Nr qx = w. For, this reason, if we consider
qx 2 Ux for any agent x 2 Nr, we have P 

qx +
P
y2Nrnfxg q

y

 w = P 
qx +
P
y2Nrnfxg q

y

. Consequently we have P qx  P qx, proving that
P constitutes a pseudomarket quasiequilibrium for this economy E
with associated random assignment Q.
For each agent x 2 Nr such that there exists a probability distrib-
ution qx meeting P qx < P qx, P is indeed a pseudomarket equilibrium
price vector. This follows a standard argument. Suppose qx 2 Ux and
P  qx = P  qx. Take a number  2 (0; 1) and build the random assign-
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ment qx = qx + (1  )qx, which meets P  qx < P  qx. But for  close
to 0, qx 2 Ux, and this would contradict the fact that P constitutes
a quasi-equilibrium. Therefore we must have P  qx > P  qx, proving
that P constitutes an equilibrium price vector for these agents.
We then focus on the agents for which there is no such probability
distribution qx. If there is no qx 2 Ux such that P  qx = P  qx, then
P is indeed a quasi-equilibrium vector for this agent x. So dene
N c = fx 2 N : 9qx 2 Ux, P  qx = P  qx = min
j2S
P jg. If N c = ? we are
done since the quasiequilibrium price vector actually constitutes an
equilibrium. Thus we assume N c 6= ?.
We claim that our partition starts by setting N1 = NnN c (the set
for which P is actually an equilibrium price vector with associated
random assignment Q1 = [qx]x2N1) and N2 [ ::: [N = N c. For this we
just need to show that N1 is not empty. If NM is not empty, we are
done. If it is, we know that there exists an "expensive" object type
i such that P i > min
j2S
P j (since P =2 f(p; :::; p) : p  0g). If no agent x
gets qix > 0, then the object type has excess supply implying P i = 0,
contradicting P i > min
j2S
P j. Therefore, some agent x 2 N gets qix > 0,
and consequently x =2 N c. Then NnN c 6= ? as we wanted to show.
For the next iteration, the "continuation economy" would consist
of Sc = fj 2 S : j  Px2N1 qjx > 0g, c = (j  Px2N1 qjx )j2Sc and N c.
We proceed as in the rst iteration to nd, subsequently, nonempty
disjoint sets N2; :::; N. For some iteration   n we have N1[ :::[N =
N since N is nite, and we are done.
We ideally want to fully characterize the set of ex-ante Pareto-
optimal random assignments. Unfortunately, the set of SP-equilibria
outcomes may not coincide with the set of ex-ante Pareto-optimal
assignments. A simple example with two agents x and y and two
objects i and j illustrates this fact. x is indi¤erent between the
objects whereas y strictly prefers object i. If N1 = fxg and N2 =
fyg there exists a SP-equilibrium such that x picks i and y picks
the remaining object j, which is not Pareto-optimal. However, the
following theorem brings us better news.
Theorem 3 For each ordered partition N1; :::; N of N, every associ-
ated Sequential Pseudomarket equilibrium outcome Q belongs to the
weak core.
Proof. Inspired on He, Miralles and Yan (2012), proposition 1 on
weak e¢ ciency. It follows a recursive argument. Let a blocking
coalition C  N be dened as follows: 9Q such that a) qx  vx < qx  vx
for all x 2 C and b) Px2C qx    Px2NnC qx. We show that it must
be the case that C = ?.
We claim that N1 \ C = ?. If not, there must be a nonempty
subset ~N  N1 and an alternative feasible random assignment Q
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such that qx  vx < qx  vx for all x 2 ~N and qx = qx for all x 2 N1n ~N .
The SP-equilibrium (with price vector P 1 associated to N1) implies
P 1 
P
x2N1 q

x < P

1 
P
x2N1 qx, and therefore
P
x2N1 q
j
x <
P
x2N1 q
j
x for
some object type j such that P j1 > 0. Since this price is strictly
positive, there is no excess supply in the reduced economy with N1 on
the demand side and  as the supply side. We must have
P
x2N1 q
j
x =
j and thus
P
x2N1 q
j
x > 
j. This constitutes a contradiction as Q is
not feasible.
Consequently, N1 \ C = ?. We focus on the "continuation econ-
omy" consisting of Sc = fj 2 S : j   Px2N1 qjx > 0g, c = (j  P
x2N1 q
j
x )j2Sc and NnN1. Using the same argument in each "con-
tinuation economy", we recursively see that N2 \C = ?, N3 \C = ?:::
Since N = [t=1Nt, we conclude that C = ?.
The weak core is a superset of the set of ex-ante Pareto-optimal
allocations, therefore the latter concept of e¢ ciency is ner. How-
ever, we consider that the weak core is a nice concept of ex-ante
e¢ ciency because there are no monetary transfers in this economy.
A potential coalition that needs to attract an indi¤erent agent to
the coalition in order to make all of its previous members better-o¤
has no means inside a random assignment economy to attract the
indi¤erent agent.
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